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Down through the centuries, death has been very easy to recognize. 
The heart stopped beating. Breathing ceased. Muscles stiffened with 
rigor mortis. Ultimately, putrefaction occurred. Now, modern medi-
cine with its artificial life supports can postpone any of the above 
signs of death. Furthermore, the discovery of transplantation makes it 
desirable to artificially delay the onslaught of these signs in organ 
donors, so that the chances of a successful transplant are increased. In 
order to determine whether a person on artificial life supports has 
died, a new sign of death has been proposed - brain death. 
This paper philosophically examines whether brain death is equiva-
lent to the death of the whole man, critiques the guidelines proposed 
by the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee for Irreversible Comas, and reveals 
an alarming, though natural, consequence of the brain death move-
ment. 
In order to begin our examination of this new sign of death, it is 
first necessary to determine what death is. To determine philosoph-
ically what something is, we must proceed according to the meta-
physical principle that activity follows upon a nature. In other words, 
what a thing can do depends upon what kind of thing it is. Thus a dog 
cannot act like a bird, for a dog does not have the nature of a bird. 
Thus, to determine what death is, we must examine the acts that 
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follow upon death. Death has no acts of its own; death, rather, is the 
absence of life. Thus we understand the nature of death by negating 
the nature of life. To attain an understanding of the nature of life and 
thus of death, let us compare a corpse with a living man. Both possess 
a body. But the corpse's body does not move of its own accord. Only 
the living body possesses the capacity of self·movement and of self-
action, for the corpse lacks the life-giving soul, which through its 
animation of the body enables it to act and to move itself. Thus 
through the life given by the soul, the animated body can perform 
certain activities such as being conscious, reproducing, pumping blood, 
breathing, nutriating, etc. These activities, signifying life, are called 
vital activities because they are vital or crucial for the well-being of the 
entire person. It is through the oneness of the soul that the body 
possesses the integration and the unity whereby the vital capacities act 
for the good of the entire person. Therefore, since vital activities pre-
suppose the presence of the soul, their presence indicates that the soul 
is animating the body; their absence indicates that the soul has sep-
arated from the body. Death, then, as the negation of life, entails the 
separation of the soul from the body. This is how the non-Christian 
Plato defined death: 
Death ... is nothing else but the separation from each other of two things, 
soul and body . . .. 1 
Upon the separation of body and soul in death, the integrated vital 
capacities cease because the body is so destroyed that it is no longer 
capable of being animated by the soul. Death, then, is irreversible for, 
like Humpty Dumpty, once the soul/body union is broken, the 
remains are so changed that they cannot be reunited. Therefore, death 
as the separation of the soul from the body is signified by the cessa-
tion of all the vital activities and the disintegration of body unity. 
This is not the definition of death used by the 1968 Harvard Com-
mittee which, rather, in effect established death as being the irreversible 
cessation of all brain functioning. Consequent upon this definition of 
brain "death," the following signs or criteria of death were proposed: 
1. Total unawareness to externally applied stimuli and inner need 
and complete unresponsiveness; 
2. No spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration 
or response to stimuli such as pain, touch, sound, or light for a 
period of at least one hour; 
3. Abolition of central nervous system activity ... evidenced in part 
by the absence of elicitable reflexes; 
4. The flat or isoelectric EEG, which is of great confirmatory value; 
5. Repetition of the above steps 24 hours later. Test not applicable 
to patients with hypothermia or under the influence of central 
nervous system depressants (barbiturates). 2 
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Fulfillment of the above criteria does not (as its authors supposed) 
indicate a dead individual, because, as Step 5 warns, patients with 
hypothermia or drugged with barbiturates also meet the above criteria, 
yet are not to be declared dead! Why are these patients considered to 
be living, while others fulfilling the same criteria are to be declared 
dead? 
Harvard does not offer an explanation, though the explanation is 
simple: the guidelines only test the functioning of some of the soul's 
vital capacities, not all. The failure of the guidelines to be comprehen-
sive explains why the criteria cannot distinguish the absence of vital 
capacities due to the separation of the soul, from the physical 
inhibition of their functioning by hypothermia or barbiturates. Con-
sequently life is confused with death. 
Since fulfillment of the Harvard criteria merely indicates that an 
individual mayor may not be dead, recovery is possible. For example, 
a 15-year-old Israeli boy could have been declared dead and buried if 
the Harvard criteria had been used. Instead, Kieffer reports that arti-
ficial life supports were used. 3 Subsequently the boy recovered. 
Recovery was only possible through continuous animation of the 
body by the soul. Death had not occurred. 
Tests Might Achieve Validity 
Perhaps the Harvard criteria could become valid if the following 
tests were included: 
1. The irreversible cessation of spontaneous heartbeat, 
2. The ending of all semblance of homeostasis, 
3. The non-absorption of oxygen by the brain or levels of metabolic 
production in the blood. 
The last criterion, proposed by Dr. James Toole of the Bowman Gray 
School of Medicine, tests to determine whether the brain is exercising 
the vital capacity of nutrition.4 If it is, then perhaps the brain has not 
been damaged sufficiently to prevent recovery of its functioning. 
Whatever criteria are adopted by modern man must determine 
whether any vital capacity continues to function. Corpses do not have 
spontaneously functioning vital capacities because they lack the soul 
that enables such functioning to occur. 
Moreover, despite the absence of any particular vital activity, the 
body as a unitary whole demonstrates its continued interaction with 
the soul by the continued integral functioning of other vital capacities, 
such as a constant normal body temperature. Thus the harmonious 
interaction of body subsystems signal life and the presence of the 
integrating soul, for without the soul, there can be no body integra-
tion. Hence, the presence of integration signifies that there is life; its 
absence signifies death. 
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Some, however, such as James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver and 
Bernard Gert, take the brain to be that which is responsible for inte-
grating body functions into an organic whole. 5 If this is true, then it 
can be argued that with the cessation of the brain's functioning, the 
body lacks organic unity and is therefore a corpse. But according to 
current medical knowledge, it is not true to attribute the body's 
integrated functioning solely to the brain, for if the brain were the 
sole integrator, then the heart, which falls outside the control of the 
brain, could never be integrated in the body unity, whereby it acts for 
the good of the whole person. But the heart is so integrated. Further-
more, even though the brain is the body's chief integrator, by virtue of 
the fact that the parts of the brain serve as "control centers" for 
various body subsystems, the integrating input of the brain occurs as a 
result of complex biofeedback mechanisms of which the brain is a 
member. Therefore integration can continue, albeit not indefinitely, 
without any input from the brain. As long as body integration occurs, 
the body is animated by that principle whereby it is enabled to func-
tion, i.e., the soul. Thus death does not always occur when the entire 
brain ceases to function. 
This fact, acknowledged by medical science, is the reason why brain 
"death" proponents propose that it is the irreversibility of a non-
functioning brain , not its nonfunctioning per se, which is the sig-
nificant factor in determining whether death has occurred. But it has 
.' been pointed out that irreversibility is a bogus criterion of death 
because it is contingent upon " ... the current state of medical knowl-
edge and on the availability of adequate life-support systems in the 
concrete circumstances." 6 This contingent aspect of irreversibility 
marks it as an unreliable criterion of the absoluteness of death, for 
with progress in medical science, something once considered irrever-
sible can, in fact, be reversed. For example, it was once thought that 
the cessation of the heart's functioning was irreversible, and indeed, it 
was because medical science lacked the know-how and the equipment 
to reverse the heart's cessation of functioning. Likewise, through 
future progress in medical science, the brain's functioning, when con-
sidered irreversibly lost, may be restored. To that end, Dr. P. Safar has 
I \ started research on resuscitating the brain. 7 
Furthermore, the resuscitation of the heart or of the brain is pos-
sible as long as their non-functioning is not caused by a destruction of 
the organ that makes animation of the soul impossible. Thus brain 
"death," insofar as it pertains to a loss of functioning, is a misnomer, 
for death occurs because the body is damaged to such an extent that 
the soul cannot animate it, whereas the declaration of brain "death" 
prescinds from any damage sustained by the organ. Even so, we have 
seen that the soul's inability to animate a particular damaged part of 
the body does not necessarily mean that the soul is separated from the 
entire body. Again, the sign or criteria of death is the absence of 
August, 1982 243 
integrated body unity due to destruction, not the absence of the 
functioning of any single body part. 
However, it is argued that, unlike the absence of other body func-
tions, the absence of the brain's functioning, due to the destruction of 
the brain, suffices for declaring death. William Lester explains: 
Its [the soul's] reason for existence is intellectual activity. For its activity in 
this life it needs the use of a material brain. But when the brain can no 
longer be used , the intellec tual soul no longer has reason to be united with 
the body; so the union ceases and the man is dead. Brain death, th en, is the 
death of the man. 8 
Lester has correctly pinpointed that the fulfillment of human life in 
knowledge and in love depends upon the functioning of the brain. Yet 
insofar as the part of the brain necessary for cognition and for social 
interaction is the neocortex, the conclusion can be drawn from 
Lester's arguments that the person dies upon the destruction of his 
neocortex. Thus the definition of death could be expressed in the 
words of Robert M. Veatch: death is " ... the irreversible loss of the 
embodied capacity for social interaction."9 But this definition is 
erroneous, for body integration can continue even with the neo· 
cortical destruction that makes social interaction and cognition impos-
sible. Continued body integration is manifested by the functioning of 
other vital capacities, such as the maintenance of a constant body 
temperature, self-movement, etc . These are the activities of the living. 
Corpses, remember, cannot act like the living because they lack the 
nature necessary to so act. Therefore, Karen Ann Quinlan is a living 
refutation of Lester's and Veatch's definition and criteria of death. 
For though Karen Ann has lost that capacity for social interaction and 
for cognition, she breathes, she moves, and thus she lives. She lives 
because her body is animated by her soul, whereby integrated vital 
activities continue, notably, respiration and circulation. 
Death, then, cannot be defined as the nonfunctioning nor the 
destruction of any particular organ, such as the brain, nor of any part 
of an organ system, such as the neocortex. Rather, death must be 
defined as the separation of the body from its animating and integrat-
ing soul. Taking this definition, the only criteria possible for ascertain-
ing when death has occurred is the disintegration of the body's unity 
and the cessation of its vital activities. It remains for medical science 
to provide the empirical guidelines whereby disintegration can be 
verified. 
Until medical science can ascertain with absolute certitude the 
exact moment of death, it should err on the side of life. Yet, the 
pressures of transplantation seem to be forcing many medical profes-
sionals, laymen and legislatures to err on the side of death, as they 
seek to define death only in terms of brain "death." (The problem of 
the high cost of artificial life supports is often cited as another justifi-
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cation for brain "death"; however, the principle of extraordinary 
means resolves this problem.) Indeed, brain "death" first became legal-
ized in Kansas (1970) as an amendment to organ donor legislation. 
Moreover, the President's Commission on Defining Death reported the 
decision of a Maryland judge, who in 1979 refused to apply the brain 
"death" criteria in a nontransplant case. 10 Even the 1980 legalization 
of brain "death" in Connecticut occurred as an amendment to its 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. 
Protection of Transplant Surgeons 
Brain "death" is often legalized as an attempt to protect transplant 
surgeons from lawsuits.!1 Lawsuits, such as Tucker u. Lower 1972, 
have arisen because a heart can continue to beat spontaneously despite 
brain "death," provided that a respirator supplies it with the oxygen it 
needs to survive. It is these hearts which make good transplants. But a 
spontaneously beating heart by functioning for the good of the whole 
body is helping to preserve body integration. Therefore, it is a sign 
that the soul is still present. Death has not yet occurred, thus trans-
plantation at this time kills the donor, though in the 27 states with 
brain "death" statutes, no murder would have been committed.12 It is 
interesting, however, to note that in most of these states the tradi-
tional criterion of death, which is cardiopulmonary failure, has not 
been eliminated. Indeed the cardiopulmonary and the brain "death" 
criteria co-exist in the Uniform Determination of Death Act approved 
as an appropriate statute during 1980-81 by the President's Commis-
sion on Defining Death, the American Bar Association, the American 
Medical Association, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, the American Academy of Neurology and the 
American Electroencephalographic Society. This act states : 
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of cir-
culatory and respiratory functions , or (2) irreversible cessation of all func-
tions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination 
of death must be made in accordance with acceptable medical standards 
(emphasis mine). 13 
Though in this proposed statute an attempt is made to unify the 
cardiopulmonary criteria of death with the brain "death" criteria via 
the little word "or," it is that little word which indicates the inherent 
contradiction between the two criteria. The irreversible cessation of 
circulatory and respiratory functions does not mean that the brain has 
irreversibly ceased functioning, though the brain cannot continue to 
function without a functioning heart and lungs. Likewise, the irrever-
sible cessation of all brain functioning does not mean that the heart 
has ceased to function. Thus this statute offers two disharmonious 
criteria of death, stemming from the consideration of two somewhat 
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independent vital activities. But, as this paper has tried to argue, a 
person is dead only when all the vital activities indicating body inte-
gration have ceased functioning. 
Yet, in its determination of death, the President's Commission on 
Defining Death is willing to ignore all vital activities other than those 
of the brain. Thus it does not recognize that a heart's spontaneous 
beating, coupled with other vital signs such as bodily warmth, are 
activities of the living. Rather it calls the brain "dead" corpses when 
they " ... typically have some appearance of life, such as a moving 
chest, pulsing blood vessels, and bodily warmth."14 Now here is a 
confusion on the part of the Commissioners, for they confuse appear-
ances with the causes of those appearances. Indeed, "a moving chest, 
pulsing blood vessels, and bodily warmth" do make a corpse appear 
alive, but if these appearances are caused by machines, then they are 
deceiving, because then they are not the result of the body's self-
activity. It is quite possible for a machine to directly cause the chest 
to move, the heart to beat and the body to remain warm, but a 
heart-lung machine can only maintain these appearances for several 
hours. However, the brain "dead" whose breathing is caused by a 
respirator can still have a warm body and a beating heart which results 
from self-activity. And since activity reveals nature, the self-activity of 
certain vital capacities indicates the soul is present. The brain "dead" 
lives, for corpses cannot of their own accord act alive. 
Moreover, the Willingness to declare someone dead when his or her 
brain "irreversibly" ceases to function facilitates an acceptance of 
materialism, wherein the soul's existence is denied. For the brain 
"death" movement is materialistic insofar as it refuses to acknowledge 
as significant any activity of a person aside from that of his brain. 
Thus it is only one small step for the materialistically orientated to 
state that if life is identified with the brain's functioning, then those 
with brain impairments, who cannot live life to the fullest , should be 
eased out of that minimally human life. The severely mentally 
retarded and those "vegetables" like Karen Ann Quinlan could then be 
killed . Such acts of euthanasia are a natural outgrowth of the material-
ism which is encouraged by the brain death movement. 
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Are You Moving? 
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a differ-
ent address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage 
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and 
more costly. Your cooperation in keeping us up-to-date with 
your address will be most helpful. 
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